

Message Text

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TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 037517

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG

FOLLOWING REPEAT DAR ES SALAAM 701 ACTION SECSTATE DTD 15 FEB

QTE

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 0701

NODIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY, LONDON, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, PRE
TORIA,
USUN, CAPETOWN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, RH, WA, SF

SUBJECT: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS

REF: A) LONDON 1792 RPTD STATE 23144, B) MAPUTO 118 RPTD STATE
27871

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1. SUMMARY: WE BELIEVE, LIKE EMBASSY MAPUTO, THAT THE
GUERRILLAS CANNOT BE EXCLUDED FROM A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA
AND THAT THE US SHOULD AVOID TAKING SIDES AMONG ZIMBABWEAN
NATIONALISTS WHILE ALLOWING THE DYNAMICS OF THE SITUATION TO WORK
THEMSELVES OUT FURTHER. ON NAMIBIA, HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO US
THE TIME FOR AT LEAST CAUTIOUS ACTION, POSSIBLY THROUGH THE NEW
UN COMMISSIONER FOR NAMIBIA, HAS COME. LOOMING OVER BOTH

THESE PROBLEMS IS THAT OF SOUTH AFRICA, AND WE FEEL THE US SHOULD BEGIN TO DEAL WITH SOUTH AFRICA QUA SOUTH AFRICA RATHER THAN WITH IT MAINLY AS AN INSTRUMENT IN OUR APPROACH TO RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA. END SUMMARY.

2. RHODESIA: VERY THOROUGH AND THOUGHTFUL REFTELS FROM EMBASSY LONDON AND MAPUTO LEAVE US WITH RELATIVELY LITTLE TO ADD ON RHODESIA. WE AGREE WITH MAPUTO THAT ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH ATTEMPTS TO EXCLUDE MILITARY LEADERS IS LIKELY TO BE A VERY DANGEROUS ONE. THEY WILL NOT DWINDLE AWAY OF THEMSELVES. THE COMMUNIST POWERS WILL GO TO CONSIDERABLE ENDS TO SUPPORT THEM. THEY HAVE A KEY ROLE IN THE THINKING OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS. AS LONDON SAYS, POLITICAL FORCES ARE MORE IMPORTANT (AND MORE PERMANENT) THAN NEGOTIATING FORMULAE. AND "THE BOYS", AS NYERERE CALLS THEM, HAVE BECOME A FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL (AS WELL AS MILITARY) FORCE.

3. FOR THE US TO TAKE SIDES AMONG THE NATIONALIST GROUPS IS ALSO TO IGNORE POLITICAL REALITIES. WE WOULD NOT ONLY LOSE MUCH OF WHATEVER TRUST WE HAVE BUILT UP AMONG AFRICANS. WE SIMPLY LACK THE MEANS TO PROMOTE EFFECTIVELY ANY CHOICE WE MIGHT MAKE AMONG THE CONTENDERS. (ANGOLA DEMONSTRATED THAT.) FURTHER, WE HERE FAIL TO SEE ANY CLEARCUT MAJORITY AMONG BLACK RHODESIANS, MODERATES OR OTHERWISE. THE SITUATION WILL HAVE TO SHAKE ITSELF DOWN. IF ANYONE CAN HELP IT TO DO SO, IT IS OTHER AFRICANS, NOT US.

4. IN DAR ES SALAAM WE MAY BE UNDULY INFLUENCED BY CONSTANT REPETITION OF NYERERE'S TWIN THEMES: "NO DEAL CAN BE MADE
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WITH SMITH" AND "DON'T RELY ON VORSTER". HOWEVER, THE LOGIC BEHIND THESE THESES (WHICH HAS BEEN OFTEN REPORTED) IS NOT UNIMPRESSIVE, NOR SHOULD THE DEPTH OF NYERERE'S BELIEF IN THEM (AND HIS POSITION AS CHAIRMAN OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS) BE UNDERESTIMATED. WE MOST EMPHATICALLY DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD ACT DIRECTLY TO REMOVE SMITH -- OR ANYONE ELSE -- FROM OFFICE. WE DO THINK THE US SHOULD KEEP CONSTANT PRESSURE ON SMITH THROUGH SUCH MOVES AS REPEAL OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT.

5. IT IS A NOT UNREASONABLE ESTIMATE THAT THE DYNAMICS OF THE SITUATION, I.E., INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, TOGETHER WITH THAT OF THE GUERRILLAS, WILL LEAD SMITH TO STEP DOWN. (WE THOUGHT HE WAS GOING TO LAST OCTOBER. WE MAY HAVE BEEN WRONG ONLY ON TIMING.) WE CONCUR WITH EMBASSY MAPUTO THAT THE BEST THING TO DO DURING THIS UNPLEASANT PROCESS IS SIMPLY TO KEEP OUR NERVE WHILE WAITING FOR THE FIRST POSSIBLE MOMENT TO STEP IN TO ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATION OF THE FINAL HANDOVER. WE AGREE ALSO THAT US NATIONAL INTERESTS WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE DAMAGED UNACCEPTABLY IF RADICAL LEADERS END UP RUNNING THE COUNTRY.

6. NAMIBIA: HERE AGAIN, WE MAY BE SOMEWHAT PAROCHIAL SINCE NYERERE IS URGING US TO CONCENTRATE ON NAMIBIA, LEAVING TIME, THE GUERRILLAS, AND THE BRITISH TO CARRY OUT THE RIPENING PROCESS ON RHODESIA. NEVERTHELESS, THERE DOES SEEM TO BE MORE SCOPE FOR DIRECT US ACTION ON THIS PROBLEM. ON THE BASIS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S CONVERSATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH NYERERE AND OF AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S CONVERSATION WITH HIM HERE FEBRUARY 6, WE AND NYERERE SEEM TO BE PRETTY MUCH IN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A NAMIBIAN SOLUTION -- ASSUMING THE US STILL HAS IN ITS POCKET WHAT VORSTER OFFERED KISSINGER. NUJOMA'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR YOUNG FEBRUARY 6 SUGGESTS THAT HE MAY BE IN AS GOOD A NEGOTIATING MOOD AS HE HAS BEEN FOR SOME TIME. CERTAINLY, HIS INTEREST AND RECEPTIVITY TO THE US UNDER A NEW ADMINISTRATION IS GREATER THAN IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST.

7. OUR FAILURE TO MOVE ON OR EVEN TO TALK AS MUCH ABOUT NAMIBIA
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AS RHODESIA COULD SOON BECOME A CAUSE OF SUSPICION AMONG AFRICAN NATIONALISTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, PROGRESS ON NAMIBIA WOULD BE LIKELY TO HAVE A CONSTRUCTIVE EFFECT ON SMITH. IF WE WANT FURTHER CLARIFICATION BEFORE WE TRY TO CATALYZE A CONFERENCE ON NAMIBIA, PERHAPS WE SHOULD GET THE NEW UN COMMISSIONER FOR NAMIBIA STARTED ON TRYING TO FIT THE PIECES TOGETHER. AHTISAARI CERTAINLY SEEMED A MODERATE, SKILLED, AND DISCREET MAN WHEN HE WAS FINNISH AMBASSADOR HERE. HE HAS INDICATED A DESIRE TO BE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US (DAR ES SALAAM 317 AND 76 DAR ES SALAAM 3702). WHY NOT TRY HIM OUT?

8. SOUTH AFRCCA: THIS IS A MUCH MORE COMPLEX SUBJECT AND ONE ON WHICH WE ARE EVEN LESS WELL QUALIFIED TO COMMENT FROM HERE. HOWEVER, WE DO THINK WE SHOULD BE ON OUR GUARD AGAINST SEEING SOUTH AFRICA TOO EXCLUSIVELY AS A FACTOR IN THE RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA SITUATIONS. CERTAINLY ITS SHORT TERM INFLUENCE ON THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM CAN BE CONSIDERABLE. AND IT IS THE DECISIVE ELEMENT IN THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM AS IT NOW STANDS. HOWEVER, IN TERMS OF LONGER RUN HUMAN, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND INTERNATIONAL DISRUPTION, SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF LOOMS MUCH LARGER THAN THE OTHER TWO. SOUTH AFRICA IS THE ONLY PLACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WHERE, EVEN ACCORDING TO NYERERE, GRADUAL CHANGE IS STILL POSSIBLE. SUCH CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA WOULD INEVITABLY MEAN CHANGE IN ITS POSITION ON RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA.

9. HERE THEN WE MIGHT BEGIN TO DEFINE FOR OURSELVES JUST WHAT CHANGES WE THINK ARE NECESSARY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND CONCENTRATE ON SOUTH AFRICA QUASOUTH AFRICA WITH A MIXTURE OF PRESSURE AND PROMISE, AIMING AT IMPROVEMENT IN ITS INTERNAL AS WELL AS EXTERNAL POLICIES. CERTAINLY, THE LAST YEAR HAS PROVEN THAT THE AFRICAN NATIONALISTS HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OUR DEALING DIRECTLY

WITH SOUTH AFRICA AS LONG AS THEY BELIEVE WE ARE TRULY SEEKING
CHANGE. SINCE SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENT WAY OF LIFE IS AS MUCH AT
VARIANCE WITH OUR OWN PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES AS IS CONTINUED
DENIAL OF INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-RULE TO THE BLACKS OF RHODESIA
AND NAMIBIA, WE HVE LITTLE CHOICE ANYWAY BUT TO DO WHAT WE CAN
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TO ENCOURAGE CHANGE.
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